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It is increasingly difficult to satisfy growing demands for spectrum with the conventional policy of fixed spectrum allocation.
To overcome this problem, flexible/dynamic spectrum sharing methods that can significantly improve spectrum utilization of the
spectrum have gained increasing interest recently. This paper presents two dynamic spectrum sharing approaches, a centralized and
a decentralized one. The centralized approach is based on hierarchical trading. Each level of hierarchy is composed of “markets”
that are associated with a certain spatial area and trading occurrence frequency, whereas area size and trading occurrence frequency
depend on the hierarchy level. The decentralized approach is based on game-theory. There, it is assumed that the operators are
averse to unequal payoffs and act unselfishly, enabling a stable and sustainable community. Numerical results show that, in the
observed scenario, both proposals outperform the reference case of fixed resource allocation significantly in terms of utilized
bandwidth. Whereas, negotiation costs for spectrum brokerage appear in the centralized approach, nonnegligible amounts of
spectrum are lost in the decentralized approach due to collisions. Thus, a hybrid of centralized and decentralized approach that
exploits the benefits of both is also considered.
Copyright © 2008 Takefumi Yamada et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radio spectrum assignment and coordination has been
under government administration. Licensing to a partic-
ular dominant operator for a long period has been the
traditional method for spectrum assignment in order to
avoid interference and collisions. This assignment method
reduces the risk associated with spectrum acquisition so that
relatively large investments of capital expenditure (CAPEX)
can be made to develop wide area wireless communication
services, which may take a relatively long time to become
stable and to establish profitable businesses. On the other
hand, timely spectrum allocation for new wireless network
development is necessary to deal with increasing market
demand. However, since existing wireless networks occupy
extensive parts of the available radio spectrum, there is insuf-
ficient spectrum available to all new wireless networks. Thus,
various regulatory bodies consider possibilities to address
this problem via shared use of spectrum. For example, in
the USA FCC [1–3] considers to allow sharing of unused
portions of TV band [4–6], in Europe a comprehensive study
for the European Commission on conditions and options in
secondary spectrum trading is done [7], and in Japan the
government implemented a frequency band on a registration
basis (4.9 GHz–5.0 GHz) to promote shared use of spectrum
[8].
One promising technology to enable spectrum sharing
and alleviate the problem of insufficient spectrum is Mitola’s
concept of “cognitive radio” [9], a radio which senses
its environment and dynamically adapts to it. Generally
speaking, there are two control concepts for dynamic
spectrum access in cognitive radio systems: a centralized
and a decentralized one. In this paper, auctioning protocols
for centralized control and protocols based on game-theory
for decentralized control are discussed and novel control
algorithms are proposed to improve the overall spectrum
usage.
In contrast to existing real-time spectrum allocation
approaches [10–14], our centralized model with hierarchic
trading between service providers (operators) combines
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the short-term flexibility over small geographical areas,
for reacting to current traffic demands, with a long-term
reliability over large geographical areas for the operators.
Resources once acquired on a certain hierarchical level are
in possession of that respective operator for a specific time
unless he decides to rent them on more granular hierarchical
levels in a shorter term auction. In this way, the operator
can rent, on short-term basis, resources that are temporally
obsolete for him and automatically regain and continue
using them after the renting period ends. Also, from a
system-wide perspective, due to the short-term adaptation to
actual demand, the overall spectrum usage can be improved,
as resources allocated to an operator who does not need them
can be sold to another operator facing a momentary shortage
in resources.
Regarding the decentralized approach, the “inequality
aversion model” described in [15] based on social anthropo-
logical studies is studied in this paper. In [16], a decentralized
algorithm based on this model to control intersystem fairness
between two wireless systems is proposed. This model,
however, does not take into account the overall throughput
performance so that in the worst case, the payoff for all
operators equals zero. In order to avoid such a situation, we
propose a policy for improving the overall throughput within
the shared spectrum.
Negotiation costs for spectrum brokerage are needed
in the spectrum trading for efficient and flexible spectrum
sharing, whereas nonnegligible amounts of spectrum are
lost due to collisions in the decentralized spectrum sharing
approach. Thus, a hybrid between centralized and decen-
tralized approach is proposed that trades off negotiation
costs against spectrum loss caused by each of the individual
approaches. Employment of this control results in a reason-
able overall throughput performance with lower negotiation
costs compared to those of the centralized approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the spectrum sharing approaches are classified. In
Section 3, the spectrum trading resource allocation assuming
a centralized resource allocation entity is considered. The
conventional and the proposed game theoretical approach
for resource allocation in decentralized spectrum sharing
systems are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, numerical
simulations are used to illustrate the benefits of the con-
sidered resource allocation methods. Finally, conclusions are
given in Section 6.
2. SPECTRUM SHARING APPROACHES
The existing approaches for spectrum sharing can be classi-
fied according to spectrum access priority and architecture
assumption. In the following, we give more details about
each of these two criteria.
2.1. SpectrumAccess Priority
Considering access priority, two general scenarios can be
distinguished; vertical sharing (VS) where the spectrum of
the systems is shared at different priority levels, forexample,
in the spectrum pooling approach [13], and horizontal
sharing (HS) where the spectrum of the systems is shared
with equal priority, for example, in wireless local area
networks (WLAN).
A regulatory policy for VS deals with protection criteria
and their application to an existing or a new system to avoid
interference from and to other systems. For instance, radar
systems in the 5-GHz band are protected from interference
caused by WLAN devices by a regulation that stipulates the
implementation of a detection and avoidance mechanism,
for example, dynamic frequency selection (DFS) into WLAN
devices [17]. Other examples include the detection of
broadcast transmissions by other communication devices to
allow them to operate in the spectrum prioritized by the
broadcast services when it is locally and temporally not in
use by the highest priority device [18].
HS deals with methods for the spectrum sharing of wire-
less systems with equal priority. Some license exempt bands
such as ISM bands represent HS scenarios. Problems such as
how to construct a sustainable and efficient spectrum sharing
environment with minimum regulation are studied, for
example, by applying game theoretic approaches [19] or by
allowing trading licenses between existing service providers
[12]. This contribution focuses on the HS spectrum sharing
scenario.
2.2. Architecture Assumption
Spectrum sharing can also be classified based on architecture
assumptions, we distinguish centralized and decentralized
sharing. In centralized spectrum sharing, a centralized entity
controls the spectrum allocation and access procedures.
Each entity in the shared spectrum forwards its status, such
as traffic demand in the spectral and temporal domains,
to the central entity and this entity allocates the shared
spectrum among entities considering the spectral efficiency
and fairness among entities.
In decentralized spectrum sharing, carrier sense multiple
access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocols and
game-theory-based distributed decision making protocols
have been studied in [19, 20]. In these studies, each entity
is responsible for its spectrum use and its spectrum access
is based on local or possibly global policies. The goal of
these studies is to find minimum policy sets for flexible,
scalable, and sustainable shared spectrum use, depending on
the growth of market demand and the amount of traffic.
A future spectrum sharing system could exploit both
architectures, for example, centralized over larger geo-
graphical areas and decentralized architecture in local area
deployments.
3. CENTRALIZED SPECTRUM SHARING VIA
SPECTRUM TRADING
3.1. Existing Research Approaches to
Spectrum Trading
Besides technical and physical considerations, transmission
rights often have a monetary value for the users. As can
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be seen in the example of allocation of Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) frequency bands in
Germany, operators invested heavily to acquire the licenses
[21]. These licenses were auctioned by the regulating author-
ity. Auctions are a known economic instrument for selling,
that is, allocating goods and simultaneously determining the
price based on the bids of potential buyers. In the case of the
German UMTS licenses, auctions took place once, allocation
is static for next 20 years, and no resales of acquired spectrum
are allowed. However, auctions may occur in different levels
of radio resource allocation, as described in related research
publications summarized below.
In wired networks, for example, by using the resource
auction multiple access (RAMA) protocol [10], network
nodes place random numbers as bids, from which the highest
number will determine the node allowed to use the resource
in the following frame. However, bids do not refer to any
pricing information. By adding this economic aspect, real-
time auctions could be used to combine resource allocation
and pricing. In [11], real-time auctions between service
providers and users are proposed in which users compete for
available resources at every time slot, that is, on a short-term
basis such as seconds or milliseconds. The auction is held by
the service provider, who is allowed to set a reserved price to
ensure a minimum gain. The calculation of bids is performed
dynamically by the users’ cognitive radio terminals. If the
cognitive radios are multistandard nodes, they can take part
in auctions for different access points using different radio
access technologies. In this way, the cognitive radio will try
to maximize the user’s utility by maximizing the quality of
services (QoS) at the lowest price possible. The drawback
of this auctioning procedure is that it cannot give any QoS
guarantee to the nodes as in each time slot another cognitive
radio could place a higher bid than an active user and
interrupt that user transmission.
In [12], auctions on the interoperator level are intro-
duced. Since the long-term planning of operators must
consider peak traffic demand in business hours, parts of the
resources remain idle over the day. Hence, operators owning
base stations in overlapping service areas can rent unused
channels. As in the spectrum pooling [13] approach, [12]
considers OFDM based radio access, in which one OFDM
carrier can serve as an atomic auctionable item for a certain
time slot length thanks to inherent flexibility of OFDM in the
time and frequency domains.
A spectrum auctioning system based on the assumption
that an interference temperature constraint applies at a
certain measurement point is discussed in [14]. A central
spectrum manager is in operation, but the user nodes do
not trade bandwidth as a resource. Instead, they are charged
either for the received signal to interference and noise power
ratio (SINR) or for their allowed transmit power.
3.2. Proposed Approach
3.2.1. Concept of Hierarchic Trading
In current spectrum allocation practice, the resources within
the frequency range of a communication system are allocated
once by the regulating authority. Once these allocations
are made they are fixed on a long-term basis. Of course,
in this way operators can rely on the available frequency
channels and hence they are able to plan and establish their
infrastructure. This will include frequency planning to avoid
intercell interference. As a consequence, reacting to varying,
especially increasing, traffic demand is only possible on a
longer time basis, as replanning for certain areas becomes
necessary and may include the establishment of new base
station equipment. The licenses guarantee the operators
exclusive use of respective frequencies, so that interferences
from other service providers are excluded since violating
license constraints is not favorable for any operator.
The various research approaches presented in the previ-
ous section show that short-term and local adaptation to the
current traffic volume is desirable for increasing the spectral
efficiency. Traffic stochastically varies over time as well as
location. Considering peak traffic periods, a situation can
occur where one provider has his resources fully loaded and
has to refuse further connections, whereas another operator
in the same cell has unutilized capacity. However shortly
thereafter, things may change and the other provider faces
a bottleneck. Thus, operators currently facing a high traffic
load could make use of additional resources, while other
providers having temporal and local low traffic levels have
unused resources that they could offer to the other operators.
By selling their transmission licenses for a limited, well-
defined time, both the seller and the buyer of a license can
take advantage of the adapted allocation. We propose to set
up structure of short-term time frames, the trading periods,
for which resources can be traded by means of automated
double auctions. The exact spectrum trading procedure
together with the auction scheme is discussed below. In the
following paragraphs, we describe two hierarchical trading
approaches:
first, we describe a hierarchical spectrum trading concept
that consists of two hierarchies: a single countrywide, long-
term allocation hierarchy level and cell-specific, cell-sized,
short-term allocation hierarchy level;
second, after outlining the advantages and drawbacks of
a two-step hierarchy model we extend it to a hierarchical
spectrum trading concept with an arbitrary number of
levels, where countrywide and cell-specific hierarchy are
the coarsest/highest and the most granular/lowest hierarchy,
respectively.
In the concept of two-level hierarchy, we start from a given
spectrum allocation. Then by trading, this initial allocation
is adapted on cell level and the new allocation is valid for
the duration of one short-term time frame. Thereafter, a new
trading period will determine another adapted cell-specific
allocation, but starting again from the given allocation that
was used as starting point in the previous trading periods
as well. So the initial allocation is guaranteed and any
operator who is temporarily not willing to take part in
trading is not obliged to do so. In that case, he can rely
on the initial allocation and is not affected by the trading
operations on the short-term scale. In this short-term time
scale, the estimation of required resources can be very
accurate. To meet the best traffic estimation, the auctions
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for resources are conducted immediately before the actual
transmissions.
It is hard to give specific values for the duration of the
mentioned short-term trading periods. In an implementa-
tion of such a trading system, many parameters have to be
taken into account, for example, average connection times in
the underlying communication system, the inherent framing
structure, stochastic traffic parameters, and so forth. Hence,
in order to facilitate examples in this paper, we will talk about
short-term periods in the range of some minutes, without
claiming to give any directly implementable values for a
certain system.
By means of this short-term trading, the preallocated
resources can be accurately adapted to the actual demand
situation on the cell level. However, the further into the
future a given trading period lies, the more uncertain
the estimation becomes. Operators can only make rough,
averaged estimations, including recurrent variations over a
day, and generic corrections, for example, before upcoming
events with presumably higher traffic demand. However,
if an operator expects a high traffic period for a longer
time than one elementary trading period, he may desire
to acquire more transmission resources in advance for that
longer period and not just before each short trading period.
This is important to the operator, as he may desire to supply
a certain quality of service to his customers. This can only
be assured if the operator knows that he gets additionally
acquired licenses for a sufficient time. However, in the way
discussed up to here, operators still face some uncertainty
about their allocation in future time frames. After each
frame, allocation is reverted to the initial allocation and
an operator cannot be sure to acquire a certain number of
additional resources again for the upcoming frame which he
perhaps had acquired for the current frame.
Here, we see two contradicting goals of allocation: on
the one hand, the reliability of long-term fixed allocation
that allows the operator to plan into the future and to
offer quality of service levels to his customers. On the other
hand, flexible short-term adaptation will enable reactions to
current traffic variations and a higher efficiency in resource
usage. Hence, we are going to propose a trading framework
which will provide operators with a reliable allocation at
every time instant as well as it will enable the adaptation
of this allocation on several resolution levels both in time
and spatial dimension. We propose a concept with several
hierarchic market levels of different granularities in time and
spatial direction. The top and bottom levels are defined
by the discussion up to this point. The current allocation
done by the regulating bodies, that is, the status quo, has
the coarsest time and spatial resolution and will form the
highest level in our model. The time scales encompass
years and the allocation is fixed usually countrywide. At
the other end of the hierarchy, the lowest, that is, most
granular, level is given by the elementary short-term frames.
For the spatial component, at the lowest scale, we use the
natural definition of given cells. As an assumption for this
model, the coverage of cells by different operators is required
to be nearly the same. This ensures the unproblematic
exchange of transmission channels between operators in a
given location without causing interference issues or the need
to do exhaustive and nontrivial frequency planning. In this
way, one common cell represents an elementary market place
for spectrum trading at the lowest level.
Having the lowest, most granular level, and the highest,
that is, coarsest, level defined, we are now able to fill the
gap between these two scales and describe the concept of
hierarchical spectrum trading with an arbitrary number of
levels. In the following, frequency resource goods, that is,
licenses to transmit on a certain frequency, are abstractly seen
as a unit within one temporal elementary trading period. An
important assumption is that within this trading period and
within one cell, the goods are fully interchangeable and, after
the trading period, only the number of goods each operator
possesses is of interest. This will allow transactions between
arbitrary number of bidders and buyers in a trading period
and enables cell independency of certain physical constraints.
So starting from the lowest level, we can define the next
higher level by grouping trading resources of the lowest
level together. The principle is shown by an example in
Figure 1 for the grouping of frames into hours and days,
considering only the time dimension at the moment. Below
the frames, we see the timing of trading periods for the
respective transmission periods. In this example, before a day
starts, there is an auction which will allow the operators to
trade the resources for that upcoming day. A trading resource
represents a plethora of grouped elementary transmission
resources. This means that acquiring one more resource on
the day level would allow the operator to use one more
transmission resource in each elementary time frame of that
day compared to the next higher level allocation given by the
regulator. However, directly after the auction on the day level,
the grouped bunch of resources is split in time and spatial
dimension. The resulting finer parts each independently
“enter” the next, respectively, more granular, level of trading.
That is, from one bunch of resources traded at once for the
day, smaller parts for consecutive time frames, for example,
for each hour of that day, and different smaller regions result.
In the example here, the next level is the hour level. So
there will be an auction before each hour of that day, each
of which will start with the allocation outcome of the day
level. The same procedure repeats after the auction for the
hour level. Resources auctioned in a group of one hour
are split and might be traded again independently of each
other on the bottom, per time-frame level. Finally, after each
trade on the bottom level, the allocation is translated to a
physical allocation of, for example, frequency channels. As
it can be further seen in Figure 1, auctions are held as short
before the respective period as possible to meet best traffic
estimations.
At the same time with grouping frames on the time scale,
while ascending in the market hierarchy, neighboring cells
with presumably similar traffic profiles can be grouped to let
the markets with lower time granularity also have a coarser
spatial resolution. In this way, local markets with short-term
allocations are grouped into regional markets with longer-
term allocations. At the top level, as stated above, there is
the status quo of country-wide allocation lasting for several
years.
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Day 1 · · · Day k
Hour 1 Hour 2 · · · Hour m
Frame 1, 2, · · · · · · Fn
TP TP TP TP TP TP · · ·
TP hr 1 TP hr 2 · · · TP hr m
TP day 1 · · · TP day k
Time
Figure 1: Diagram showing hierarchically organized timescales of
trading periods (TP). For clarity, only grouping in time direction is
shown while spatial grouping is omitted.
3.2.2. Double Auction Scheme
Auctions are economic means to determine the value of an
arbitrary trading resource and to allocate the goods at the
same time. This is interesting especially in cases where an
absolute value for an item is not given. In the case of auctions,
the actual trading price is dependent on the bids and asks of
the involved traders.
By changing the situation from “one seller/multiple
buyers” in well-known auctions, for example, for art objects,
to “multiple sellers/multiple buyers,” a situation arises that
can be found most notably in stock exchanges. The stocks of
companies as well as shares in investment funds and many
other divisible goods such as commodities or even carbon
dioxide emission rights are traded around the clock and all
over the world. Having this in mind, trades can be made in
quasi real-time and current prices can be updated in intervals
as short as minutes. In typical stock exchange situations there
are two sides of the market, the selling and the buying side,
with one or more participants and the price determination
mechanism is called double-sided auction or double auction
for short. Similar preconditions exist in the case of mobile
service operators trading equal, elementary radio resource
goods within hierarchical trading periods. As each operator
can be a buyer or seller, dependent on current demand
estimations, double auctions are naturally used as the trading
and pricing mechanism in spectrum allocation auctions.
Furthermore, double auctions can be held in two forms:
continuous and discontinuous. Continuous auctions are
characterized by asynchronously arriving bids with regular
price updates, whereas discontinuous auctions are charac-
terized by the collection of all bids with a one time market
clearing in the end.
The continuous auction form is that used in stock
exchanges. While the stock exchange is open for trading,
participants may place their bids, that is “orders,” for a
certain stock. In the case, a newly arriving order matches
existing outstanding orders, a transaction will immediately
occur. In consequence, the newly formed price has to be
announced to all market participants. And of course, each
participant is allowed to place an arbitrary number of orders
during a trading day and naturally on every day that specific
stock is traded. For shares, these can be decades for which a
company is listed. Comparing this to the situation in resource
trading, we could identify transmission resources for a cer-
tain market level, market location, and transmission period
as a different stock. However, we assume traffic estimations to
be most accurate immediately before the actual transmission
time. But only when demand can be reliably estimated, a
possible price for bidding can be evaluated by the operators.
Hence, it is not favorable to trade transmission rights lying
far in the future for a long market opening continuously.
This goes hand in hand with the signaling overhead. Buying
and selling short-term local resources in a long-term open
market causes an unacceptable high signaling effort that is
not deterministic, as resources may repeatedly be bought
and sold again and again even by the same operators. As
stated before, it is desirable to have the auctions as short
before actual transmission frames as possible. It does not
make much sense to have an open market for the resources
of certain, perhaps fine-granular, frame which is of longer
duration than the transmission frame itself since accurate
traffic estimations and thus reasonable bidding are only
possible in the very short time before a frame starts. In our
model, longer-term traffic estimations are addressed by the
higher hierarchies of hierarchical spectrum trading concept.
For these reasons, we consider the continuous auction
model as inappropriate for the hierarchic framework pro-
posed in this work and in the following, we describe a
discontinuous double auction protocol. For each trading
frame, each operator sends his bid exactly once. After all
bids are collected, the resulting transactions are signaled
only once to all participants. In this way, the number of
messages to be exchanged is deterministic and signaling is
efficient. Furthermore, the order in which bids and asks
arrive is unimportant as it would be in the continuous case.
Altogether, this enables the auctions to be held even in the
time-critical time scale of the most granular market level.
In this paper, a special form of discontinuous dou-
ble auction, the McAfee double auction protocol [22], is
exemplarily exploited for trading of spectral resources. With
McAfee protocol operators’ strategy that maximizes own
benefit is to send real, that is, “honest,” valuations in
auction messages. In other words, with “honest” reporting
of valuations equilibrium is reached in McAfee protocol.
This property is achieved by sometimes charging buyers a
higher price than sellers receive and by prohibiting that the
least profitable trade happens in the event when buyers are
charged more than sellers. The broker receives the gains that
occur in such cases. Proposed hierarchical spectrum trading
concept is not limited to application of McAfee protocol
and could be combined with other price formation rules
for discontinuous sealed-bid auctions, some of which are
described for example, in [23]. In the following, we describe
the application of McAfee protocol to the considered spec-
trum trading concept.
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3.2.3. TradingMechanism
For the purpose of collecting bids from the operators, in
each market level and area a dedicated logical broker is
in operation. The brokers are software agents. During the
trading periods, they only have to communicate with the
trading software agents for the operators that deal with the
traffic demands in that specific cell, whereas at the end
of the day, they must transmit clearing information to a
centralized organization. So, at the local level, these software
agents can function in a distributed manner on hardware
physically collocated to the cell in order to minimize
possible latencies in the signaling procedure. Equivalently,
the operator agents can have local instances to deal with the
short-term variations in traffic, whereas regional or overall
traffic trading is planned and organized in a more centralized
way. The local hardware resources can either be provided
by one of the operators or by the regulating authority. In
both cases, costs can be balanced by fees for the operators,
for example, based on trading volume. Figure 2 shows an
example constellation, this time the spatial partitioning of
the market into three levels is used as example. The broker
instances of the “local” level, corresponding to the most
granular short-term bottom market level, conduct auctions
for single cells. On the regional level, multiple cells are
grouped and the respective regional brokers are in action
on the longer-term basis. So the outcomes of auction on
the “regional” level are passed down to the corresponding
“local” brokers, which use them as the starting point for their
auctions.
The procedure of signaling and trading is the same on
each level of the trading hierarchy. Figure 3 gives an overview
of the sequence described in the following. As the trading
period for a certain market, that is, area and trading period,
approaches, the operators determine their current estimated
demand for resources, De, and compare it to their actual
number of allocated resources, R, in order to obtain their
differential demand, Dd,
Dd = De − R. (1)
Thereby, the resource allocation R results from the outcome
of trading on the next higher, that is, coarser market level. For
a positive Dd, the operator acts as a buyer, and for a negative
Dd he acts as a seller. In any case, the operator establishes
a connection to the respective dedicated broker via the
backbone network. The operator identifies itself and sends
a market identification comprising market level, market
area, and trading period. In this way, it is unambiguously
identified which market the operator wants to participate in
and which are the resources that can be traded.
As they offer paid radio services to their customers,
operators can assign a value to the transmission right at a
specific time. This valuation depends on different factors,
varying both in time and by operator, for example, basic
operating costs, time-dependent traffic demand caused by
the customers, and pricing with respect to these, and so forth.
Based on these factors and considering the actual market
level, the operator valuation for one trading good, V, is
calculated by each operator.
It is assumed that this value is assigned equally to all
De goods of the current market level and location. So, the
maximum price an operator is willing to pay for additional
resources in the case of Dd ≥ 0 is directly given by V. By
acquiring resources for a price of pt < V , the difference,
V − pt, remains as an extra surplus for the operator.
Conversely, when selling resources that are presumably not
used, the transaction price pt directly remains as a gain for
the operator compared to holding but not consuming the
resource.
The next step in the trading mechanism is the prepa-
ration of auction messages (AM), that is, bids or asks.
Thereby, bids are prepared by potential buyers, and asks are
prepared by potential sellers. Both represent the information
actually sent to the broker. The auction messages are tuples
containing the number of resources offered or requested N,
the price pm, and a flag discriminating the bids and asks b | a,
AM:
{
(b | a),N ,pm
}
. (2)
Each operator sends his auction message to the broker.
Afterwards, the broker determines the actual transactions
based on the auction messages received using the McAfee
double auction protocol [22]:
first, he marks them with identification O for the
respective operator,
{
(b | a),N ,pm
} =⇒ {O,(b | a),N ,pm
}
, (3)
then bids and asks are expanded toN single-unit bids and
put into a bids or asks list,
{
O,(b | a),N ,pm
} =⇒ b : (O,pm) or a : (O,pm), N times,
(4)
both lists are sorted according to pm, bids in decreasing
order and asks in increasing order as indicated by
β(1) ≥ β(2) ≥ · · · ≥ β(m),
α(1) ≤ α(2) ≤ · · · ≤ α(n), respectively. (5)
So there are n asks and m bids, where α(i) represents the ith
lowest ask and β(i) the ith highest bid of the generated bid
and ask lists. Note that the broker keeps track of operator’s
identifications O associated to the specific bids and asks. In
the case that β(1) < α(1), no transaction can be made and
the auction immediately ends. Otherwise, transacting parties
must be found. For easier formulation, α(n+1) is defined
as the (fictitious) highest possible ask and β(m+1) is the
lowest possible bid. In the case that the bids or asks from
different operators are equal in price, the order within the
list is randomized.
Index k ≤ min{m,n} is determined by meeting the
following constraints,
β(k) ≥ α(k), β(k + 1) < α(k + 1). (6)
This defines the point where the bids and asks intersect. A
possible trading price, p0, is set to
p0 = 12
(
β(k + 1) + α(k + 1)
)
. (7)

























Figure 2: Diagram showing relation between operators and brokers. The instances of regional brokers (BR) and local brokers (BL) are


























Figure 3: Diagram showing the basic signaling procedure for a
trading period between one operator and the broker.
If p0 is in the interval [β(k),α(k)], all asks and bids (1) · · · (k)
result in a transaction at price pt = p0. In the other case,
where p0 /∈[β(k),α(k)], only asks and bids (1) · · · (k − 1)
result in a transaction. Furthermore, the transaction price is
different for buyers and sellers, pt,buy = β(k) and pt,sell =
α(k), whereas the difference of (k − 1)(β(k) − α(k)) is kept
by the broker, which acts as a “budget balancer.” If “honest”
valuation of resources is not of the highest priority for
participating operators, they could agree on other double
discontinuous auction type that does not include payments
to the broker.
In order to inform the operators of their trading
success, transaction messages (TM) are sent back to the
operator. The form is similar to the auction messages. A flag
indicates whether the operator has bought, sold, or made no
transaction s | b | 0, the number of resources actually traded,
and the transaction price pt:
TM :
{
(s | b | 0)N ,pt
}
. (8)
Note that for all higher market levels, this information
is sufficient for the operators, as in these stages, the
mapping of abstract resources to physical resources is not
necessary. Nevertheless, the broker will maintain a history of
transactions for clearing purposes. However, on the lowest
market level, the level with finest granularity, a common
resource scheduler needs to know the final allocation of
transmission resources for the upcoming time frame in order
to accomplish the allocation of specific physical resources.
Being a software agent, the scheduler is collocated with
the broker, since it has to serve the same operators for
the same cell as the broker. This collocation also mitigates
explicit signaling between the broker and scheduler. The
scheduler signalizes the channel numbers added or lost to
each operator after a successful transaction. That scheduler
can be designed to accomplish different goals. One possibility
is to implement an algorithm that tries to reallocate those fre-
quencies first, which were last allocated, so that a minimum
of reconfiguration becomes necessary. Another possibility is
to randomize reallocations. This would mitigate the effect of
benefitting any operator with respect to channel quality, for
example, concerning actual fading and interference situation.
Nevertheless, note that a basic assumption of our approach
is the complete interchangeability of resource goods in
order to allow efficient trading by a double auction scheme.
Consequently, it is not possible for an operator to bid for
a specific frequency channel, even on the lowest market
level, for example, to have a contiguous frequency block
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after the auction. Compared to the current fixed allocation
practice, this is not a disadvantage for operators, as by not
participating in any trades, the allocation status quo for that
operator would not change.
With respect to interference and reliability, nothing
changes from the current situation by applying the trading
approach. As the trading model is a system commonly incor-
porated by all operators, they all will adhere to the licenses
both before and after trades as they did in conventional
allocation situation. None of the operators would just use
frequencies for which no license is present, same as today
operators do not just occupy another operator’s resources.
In summary, our presented approach combines the long-
term reliability of conventional frequency allocation by the
regulating bodies with the flexibility of short-term resource
trading. By applying a hierarchic model in time and spatial
dimension, refinement of allocation can be applied in a more
and more decentralized matter, that is, the lower in the
market hierarchy one gets.
4. DECENTRALIZED SPECTRUM SHARING BASED
ONGAME-THEORY
4.1. Introduction
The focus in this section is on the game theoretical frame-
work for decentralized spectrum sharing. This framework is
flexible enough to investigate the shared spectrum usage not
only from the micropoint of view, for example, how each
operator behaves and how much payoff it gains based on
its own interest, but also from the macropoint of view, for
example, ensuring stability of the spectrum sharing.
Game-theory provides a mathematical basis for the
analysis of interactive decision-making processes. It provides
tools for predicting what will happen when agents with
conflicting interests interact [20]. A game consists of three
basic components: a set of players, a set of actions, and a
set of preferences. Furthermore, it incorporates two basic
assumptions: first, the rationality assumption, that is, the
players are rational so that they always choose strategies that
maximize their individual expected payoffs. And second, the
common knowledge assumption, that is, the specification of
the game, including at least the players set, the players’ action
sets, and the definitions of their preference relationship,
are common knowledge in the game. These assumptions
enable players to anticipate others’ strategies in the game.
In the spectrum sharing scenarios, these assumptions can
be implemented as common policy rules which all players
joining a spectrum sharing game have to follow, whereas
administration or the monitoring of the shared spectrum use
is done by a spectrum manager.
In this contribution, the players are wireless operators
that share spectrum and make decisions about acquiring the
spectrum for their signal transmissions. It is also assumed
that each operator has a player set, that is, each operator
knows which operators are joining the spectrum sharing
game. This assumption sounds reasonable as the shared
spectrum is available only for registered users and lists of
the registered operators are available, which is similar to
the Japanese registered frequency band [8]. Concerning the
action set, for example, controls of modulation scheme, cod-
ing rate, or transmit power level can be taken as the players’
(operators’) actions for the appropriate shared spectrum use
in wireless systems. In this paper, a transmit probability
control is assumed as the operators’ action set. Regarding
the common knowledge assumptions, it is assumed that the
operators are synchronized for their spectrum sharing game
so that they have a common definition of shared spectrum
goods to easily compare their own payoff with that of the
others.
When the players actually act, the outcome of the game
is derived from a preference relationship for each player.
Generally, the preference relationship is represented as a
utility function that assigns a value to each possible outcome.
Hereby, higher utilities represent more desirable outcomes.
In wireless communications, a player might prefer outcomes
that lead to higher signal-to-noise level ratios, lower bit error
rates, more bandwidth availability, more robust network
connectivity, and lower power consumption, although in
many practical situations these goals will be in conflict.
Some cooperation mechanisms among players are
needed to minimize conflicts of their signal transmissions
in the decentralized shared spectrum use. If noncoop-
erative behavior is allowed, all players try to maximize
their individual payoffs by increasing their transmission
probabilities, resulting in frequent signal collisions among
players; preventing them from acquiring any payoffs at
worst. For instance, IEEE 80 211 applies some rules for
signal transmission such as the listen before talk protocol
and random back off control in order to provide equal
signal transmit opportunity to all operators, resulting in the
establishment of stable and effective shared spectrum usage.
4.2. Conventional Policy Rule
Designing policy rules that can control the tradeoff between
fairness among operators and the overall throughput per-
formance is important for the cooperative decentralized
approach. For instance, in [24] a punishment policy for
selfish users in CSMA/CA networks was proposed, which
assumed that operators joining a game basically have the
potential to behave selfishly. The basic mechanism of this
punishment policy is to jam the packets from deviating self-
ish users. This mechanism reallocates a portion of the shared
spectrum for the purpose of signal transmission, which leads
to degradation in the overall throughput performance. On
the other hand, based on the assumption that the operators
are altruists, another policy was proposed in [15] known as
the “inequality-aversion model.” This model is based on the
aversion to inequality of operator payoffs in a game, which
was originally established by social anthropology studies.
By using this policy, operators act as altruists and their
unselfish behavior enables their community to be stable
and sustainable. We focus on this model to investigate
decentralized spectrum sharing among operators because it
is natural to assume that all operators desire a sustainable
wireless communication environment. The utility function
Takefumi Yamada et al. 9

























where ui is the utility of the ith operator, and xi and xj ( j /=i)
indicate the payoff for the ith and jth operators, respectively.
Payoffs are numbers which represent the motivations of
players, such as their profit, quantity, or other continuous
measures. In this paper, the payoffs indicate the amount
of spectrum used for their signal transmissions. Term n
is the number of operators sharing the spectrum. Ai is
the priority level of ith operator among all operators for
payoff. When some operators have priorities over other
operators for payoff, their payoffs in (9) are discounted
according to their priority level. Also αi and βi indicate the
reacting factor of the ith operator against other operators
who receive a higher payoff and against operators who receive
lower payoffs, respectively. Since utility functions express the
operator satisfaction level, each operator behaves to maxi-
mize his own utility function independently. Based on an
anthropological study [15], it is also shown that a sustainable
community where each operator receives the same payoff
can be established by setting αi > βi. This parameter setting
model of the operators’ preference when his payoff is less
than that of the other operators is different from that when
his payoff is more than that of the other operators. In [16],
operators and payoffs are referred to as wireless operators
and transmission time (airtime), respectively, for controlling
intersystem fairness based on the inequality aversion model.
In this paper, it is assumed that all operators can exchange
their payoff values and the priority levels by the information
exchange via a backbone network connected to all operators.
It is also possible for each operator to measure his payoff
individually by monitoring all transmitted signals from users
and by detecting to which operators the users belong by using
signal headers which include IDs of their affiliations.
However, this conventional policy does not take the
overall throughput performance into consideration so that
a situation may result where all operators have equal
zero payoffs, which is the worst case from the spectrum
availability point of view. In order to avoid such problems,
we propose an improvement to existing inequality aversion
model: a policy in which each operator considers the overall
status of the shared spectrum usage for calculation of its
utility function.
4.3. Policy Rule Considering SpectrumAvailability
Because the conventional policy rule controls the fairness
for shared spectrum usage without considering the operator
payoff, there is a case where the spectrum is not fully utilized.
This is a problem from the viewpoint of overall throughput
performance. Therefore, in order to improve the overall
throughput performance, we propose to adjust the utility
functions of operators depending on the spectrum usage
status such as the operator payoff, the amount of unused
spectrum, and the amount of spectrum loss caused by signal
collisions. In this proposal, the adjusting coefficient for the
ith operator utility function referred to asCi is defined below:
Ci = Call − γCcoll,i∑n
j=1xj + Ccoll,i
= Call − γCcoll,i
Call − Cblank,i , (10)
where Call is the total amount of shared spectrum, Cblank,i
indicates the amount of unused spectrum measured by the
ith operator, Ccoll,i is the amount of spectrum loss caused
by signal collisions, and γ reflects the sensitivity for the
spectrum loss over the unused spectrum. Ideally these values
are common for all operators but they may be different
for each operator due to their measuring errors when
assuming each operator measures individually the values of
Cblank,i, Ccoll,i, and xj by sensing their surrounding radio
environment.
The coefficient Ci decreases according to an increase
in the amount of spectrum loss and increases according
to an increase in the amount of unused spectrum. By
weighting the utility function ui from (9) by Ci, operators
act more actively to get their payoff when there is a relatively
large amount of unused spectrum and more passively when
there is a relatively large amount of spectrum loss. This
adjustment enables operators to behave independently while
considering both multilevel fairness and overall throughput
maximization.
4.4. Application toWireless Communication Systems
As an example for applying these spectrum sharing policies
to wireless communication systems, it is assumed that they
are implemented as a transmit probability control for each
operator. The transmit probability for the ith operator at the
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where ΔPi(t) is the update to transmit probability of the ith























where Ai = Wiλi and Wi indicates a discounting factor
according to priority level of ith operator, and λi is the traffic
demand for the ith operator.
When applying the proposed policy, the transmit proba-







pi(t − 1) + ΔPi(t)
)))
. (13)
By controlling the transmit probability of each operator
based on the above equations, the policies on spectrum
sharing can reflect the behavior of each operator.
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5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results obtained through computer
simulations are presented.
5.1. Evaluations for Centralized Approaches Via
Spectrum Trading
5.1.1. Simulation Configuration
To evaluate the feasibility of the described spectrum trading
approach introduced in this contribution, simulations were
conducted considering trading in one cell. In the cell, 100
channels are assumed to be available as trading goods. “Level
0” (L0) refers to the lowest and most granular level in market
hierarchy, that is, it represents the short-term case. Several
trading periods of L0 are grouped to form a trading period
of “Level 1” (L1) which represents the long-term case. “Level
2” (L2) is seen as the static case and its allocation can be
seen as given by the regulator. In the simulations presented
here, available channels, that is, trading goods, are equally
distributed among the operators at the highest level L2,
allowing a difference of one resource between operators to
exactly match the sum of 100 channels.
The resource demand modelled on L0 is the actual
demand the operators are facing and trying to satisfy via
spectrum trading. The demand on a higher level L1 is equal
to the mean demand over several L0 trading periods that
compose the L1 market. In this way, from the L1 perspective,
the operators are aiming to satisfy their prospective average
need for resources and finer resource adjustments happen on
L0. To evaluate resource usage later, only actual demand (L0)
will be compared to the resource allocations of the static case
(L2) and the allocations after the trading processes on L1 and
L0.
In our simulation scenario, eight operators are com-
peting for the transmission resources. In each simulation
round, one trading period on L1 is conducted. Afterwards,
the outcome is passed down to 40 L0 trades.
In order to model traffic variations on the short-term
level L0, demand of each operator is changed from one
trading period to the next by means of a random walk.
That is, the demand is with equal probabilities increased
or decreased by 1 unit, not going below 0 units and not
exceeding 100. The start value of the random walk process is
the demand drawn for L1. Thus, the mean of the resulting
statistical process on L0 remains the same as the demand
chosen for L1. Variations in traffic demand according to
the random walk process are illustrated by an example
in Figure 4 for one simulation period, that is, for 40 L0
trading periods. For clarity, only arbitrary three out of eight
operators are shown. The starting point on the left side of the
figure is the demand on L1.
Whereas the random walk model on L0 aims at mod-
elling dependencies of demands in the short-term case, a
well-known assumption for packet-based traffic of indepen-
dent sources is to follow the Poisson distribution. So for L1
traffic modelling, we chose independent but equally param-
eterized Poisson processes to draw L1 demands for each
L0 iteration



















Figure 4: Illustrating the random walk traffic model for arbitrary
three out of eight operators.
operator and simulation round. The Poisson distributions
mean parameter λ is chosen so that the overall demand as the
sum of operators’ demands as a parameter of the simulation
is met in the interval of 40, . . ., 200 resources.
Finally, for each simulation, the price V, which an
operator is willing to pay for a trading resource, is drawn
from a discrete uniform distribution. Each operator draws
the values independently from the interval [1, . . ., 100] once
per simulation round.
5.1.2. Results
For system-wide comparison of efficient resource usage, the
overall number of actually used resources is determined
using the static allocation (L2) and the allocations achieved
after trading both on levels L1 and L0. So each operator
used as much resources as possible within the respective
allocation, but not more than given by the traffic demand
modelled on L0. The resource usage is shown relative to the
maximal value of 100 resources.
In the complete range of simulated system load, an
increase in system-wide efficiency by resource trading can be
observed in Figure 5.
Furthermore, it is shown that by short-term adapting
the allocation on L0, the allocation accomplished on L1 can
further be improved, as actual traffic can be considered and
not only the mean estimate of L1 is used. The maximum
efficiency increase in this simulation from fixed allocation
to short-term trading can be observed to be up to 11.8
percentage points at an overall demand of 100 resources in
this scenario.
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Figure 5: Overall resource usage at different market levels of the
centralized spectrum trading approach.
As a second figure of merit, the mean relative outage
per operator is studied to account for the operator-centric
view of the trading process. Outage occurs when the final
resource allocation for an operator is less than actual traffic
demand. That means, that traffic has to be dismissed, or vice
versa, additional resources could have been used if they had
been acquired before. The absolute outage is the number
of resources needed but not acquired. To make figures
comparable for different demand situations, the outage is
given relative to the actual traffic demand of the respective
operator. In Figure 6, relative outage is plotted for the given
scenario against the overall usage of resources as they can be
found in Figure 5. So for example, at a fixed given outage
of 5% at the operator level, we can observe the system-wide
resource usage to increase significantly about 41%.
5.2. Evaluations for decentralized approaches based
on game-theory
5.2.1. Simulation configuration
The general setting such as the number of resource channels
and operators, and the settings of trading levels and traffic
models is the same as for the evaluations of centralized
approach. In the following, assumptions specific for evalu-
ations of the decentralized spectrum sharing approach are
described. They are basically the same as in [16] except that
signal collision status is taken into account.
In the decentralized approach, it is not possible to
allocate the spectrum resources to the operators in the L2
market level because there is no negotiation protocol for the
resource allocation prior to starting the spectrum sharing
game. The traffic demand estimation in the market L2
Mean resource usage


























Figure 6: Operator-centric outage measure plotted against the
mean resource usage found in Figure 5.
used for the calculation of weights Ai of the decentralized
approach is defined as the mean value of the traffic demand
in L1 market level for each operator, instead of the L2 auction
of the centralized approach.
(i) Transmission packet size is the same for all users
and their transmission timings are slotted and
synchronized ideally, like a slotted ALOHA. The
implementation complexity for the synchronization
in L0, L1, and L2 is different depending on their
control granularity. For example, L0 needs the tight-
est synchronization so that the complexity is the
highest among them. For simplicity reasons, in the
evaluations, it is assumed that all levels of control are
implemented ideally so that synchronization errors
do not occur.
(ii) Each operator accesses all channels with the same
transmit probability at the same time. Note that the
initial transmit probabilities are set to 1.
(iii) Each operator has a unique ID included within their
transmission signals. Operators can sense the IDs so
that they can measure the traffic demand λi for ith
operator via spectrum sensing.
(iv) Carrier sensing works ideally and no hidden terminal
is present. Also, sensing error caused by propagation
time difference and by switching time lag from
sensing mode to signal transmit mode is small
enough to neglect.
(v) Parameters α and β are set to 1.0, 0.01, respectively,
which are heuristically selected so that the best
performance can be achieved for the conventional
policy with L0 control. Also, parameter γ is set to
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0.9, which is selected for the best performance of the
proposed policy with α = 1.0 and β = 0.01.
(vi) Discounting factor Wi is set to 1 for all operators.
In order to evaluate policy from the fairness point of











In (14), n is the number of operators, Ti is the throughput
for the ith operator, and Ai is the weight for the ith operator
which is set according to the operators’ traffic demand. The
closer to one FI is, the fairer the spectrum sharing is.
As a reference, the conventional policy, described in
Section 4.2, which deals with only interoperator fairness is
used in the subsequent simulations.
5.2.2. Results
Figure 7 shows the performance of overall resource usage.
Similar to the centralized approach, it can be seen that the
more granular the control level is, higher the overall through-
put performance is for both the conventional and proposed
policy rules. Also, the proposed policy exhibits higher overall
throughput performance than the conventional policy at the
same control level. In Figure 8, relative outage is plotted
for the given scenario against the overall usage of resources
as they can be found in Figure 7. Compared with the
conventional policy at the 40% of outage for an example,
improvements of approximately 0.17, 0.15, and 0.14 point
can be achieved by the proposed policy for the control L0,
L1, and L2, respectively.
When the mean traffic demand exceeds the number of
the available resources, the overall throughput performance
for the conventional policy starts to decrease according to
the increase of the total offered traffic. Figure 9 shows the
performance of overall spectrum loss, which is the sum of
the loss caused by the signal collision and unused spectrum,
when L0 traffic control is assumed. As the overall mean traffic
demand grows, the number of the signal collisions increases
on a faster pace than the amount of unused spectrum
decreases. This is because the conventional policy cannot
take into account signal collision status for the transmission
probability control. Assume that an operator could not
acquire any resources although he tried to do so with the
appropriate transmission probability. In this situation, he
will increase his transmission probability, which will cause
additional signal collisions and worsen the overall resource
usage performance. This situation is a negative spiral in
which collisions attract collisions. In the result, the amount
of overall spectrum loss for the conventional policy achieves
minimum when the traffic demand is 100. Overall spectrum
loss performance is dominated by unused spectrum and
signal collisions at mean traffic demands below and under
100, respectively.
The proposed policy however can take into account the
amount of the spectrum loss caused by signal collisions. With
it the user transmission probability decreases in accordance
Proposed
Conventional
Overall mean traffic demand

























Figure 7: Overall resource usage in the game-theory based
approach.
with the increase in the offered load to mitigate the
degradation in the overall throughput performance caused
by signal collision. Also as an outcome, the total loss amount
for the proposed policy is lower than that of the conventional
policy even for relatively high traffic demands.
This performance improvement of overall resource usage
is achieved at the cost of interoperator fairness, as illustrated
in Figure 10. As for the proposed policy, it is shown that
the more granular the control level is, the better fairness
performance is, because of the increased estimation accuracy
for the traffic demand. Also better fairness performance
is achieved by the conventional policy regardless of the
granularity of the control level and the total amount of
offered traffic in the situation where the traffic demand is
fewer than around 120. For higher traffic demands however,
the performance for the proposed policy on all control levels
is better than that for the conventional one. This is because
the proposed policy can solve the negative spiral mentioned
above by its transmission probability control according to the
channel usage status, resulting in reducing the spectrum loss
due to signal collisions and can make rooms to improve the
fairness performance among operators.
The presented results show that the proposed policy rule
allows operators with a relatively large demand to increase
their transmission probability. That is, they prioritize the
improvement in the overall throughput over interuser fair-
ness when they recognize there is a chance to increase their
throughput without harming others based on the proposed
policy rule.




























Figure 8: Operator-centric outage measure plotted against the
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Figure 9: Overall spectrum loss performance in the game-theory
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Figure 10: Inter-operator fairness performance in the game-theory
based approach.
As demand increase, signal collisions among operators
occur more frequently. Thus, the amount of lost spectrum
becomes large and the amount of the unused spectrum
becomes small. In such a situation, the proposed policy
encourages operators to prioritize interoperator fairness over
total throughput improvement.
5.3. A Possible Hybrid Approach for Centralized and
Decentralized Sharing
Figure 7 shows that the overall throughput performance for
the decentralized approach can be improved by employ-
ing the proposed policy. However, the maximum overall
throughput is approximately 0.41 and there is still a big dif-
ference in performance compared to that of the centralized
approach via spectrum trading. The main reason for this
performance gap is that the decentralized approach achieves
probabilistic spectrum sharing control. This sometimes
results in misallocated shared spectrum so that signal col-
lisions among operators are generated, leading to spectrum
loss and unused spectra. This can be considered as a cost
for decentralized control that enables scalable infrastructure
construction, whereas negotiation cost for brokerage is
needed for the centralized approach via spectrum trading
that achieves deterministic spectrum allocation.
In order to flexibly control the tradeoff of these costs,
we propose a method for reducing the number of signal
collisions by introducing a simple central negotiation mech-
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anism suitable for the “spectrum pooling” concept. In the
spectrum pooling concept, spectral ranges from different
spectrum owners (military, trunked radio, etc.) are merged
into a common pool so as to maximize the overall spectrum
availability [26]. Also, a negotiation mechanism among the
operators that enables to temporarily rent spectral resources
from other operators during their idle periods is considered
in [13]. Motivated by this spectrum pooling concept, the
proposed hybrid approach consists of three phases with the
framework of the centralized market hierarchy described in
Section 3.2.
(1) On the hierarchic trading levels L1 and higher, that
is, coarser ones, spectrum trading is held using the
centralized approach presented in Section 3.2.
(2) After trading on L1, the operators compare the
amount of resources they posses to their traffic
demands estimated on the short-term level L0. Then
they put the channels which are estimated unused
into a spectrum pool. Finally, it is broadcasted
which resource channels are in the pool (e.g., which
channels are opened) to each operator.
(3) In the last step located on the bottom of the hierarchy,
that is, at L0, only operators who want more channels
join the spectrum sharing game over the resources
from the pool using the policy described in Section 4.
This approach is a centralized and decentralized hybrid
approach. Centralized mechanisms are required to conduct
the spectrum trading and to share operator channel usage
information among them in phases (1) and (2), such as
which channels are traded by which operators and which
channels are available for the spectrum sharing game. Phase
(3) can be implemented in a decentralized manner. In that
way, spectrum trading costs are avoided on the fastest and
most granular level L0 for the tradeoff of possible capacity
losses due to signal collisions.
In Figure 11 an example of performance comparisons
for resource usage among the centralized approach, the
proposed decentralized approach and the hybrid approach
is shown in the case that mean demand corresponds to
the number of the available resources. Comparing the
overall resource usage performance, the hybrid approach
can drastically improve the overall throughput performance
compared to the decentralized approach. One reason is that
it can reduce the frequency of signal collisions by limiting the
number of channels available for the spectrum sharing game
and by reducing the number of operators participating in the
game. However, as shown in the figure, a few signal collisions
and a larger amount of unused spectrum still occur so
that an approximate 0.1 points of performance degradation
in the overall resource usage compared to the centralized
approach remains. The advantage of the hybrid approach
is that it does not need detailed information to identify the
channel usage status one by one for each operator. It only
needs to know which channels are opened or closed for the
spectrum sharing game for the L0 control level. Thus, the
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Figure 11: Performance comparisons of centralized, decentralized,
and hybrid approach when the overall mean traffic demand equals
the number of the available resources.
In this way, the proposed hybrid approach can be posi-
tioned between the centralized and decentralized approaches
considering the performance and flexibility viewpoints. It
allows a flexible tradeoff between spectrum loss and central
negotiation costs.
6. CONCLUSION
We proposed a spectrum trading mechanism suited to
spectrum sharing among wireless operators in a centralized
manner, and a policy for decentralized spectrum sharing,
which improves the overall throughput performance while
considering fairness performance among operators. The
proposed policy for the decentralized approach is based
on game-theory and implemented as an adaptive transmit
probability control algorithm. The proposals are evaluated by
numerical simulations. The results show that the proposed
centralized mechanism can absorb the peak traffic demand
without any additional spectrum bands by introducing
multilevel hierarchical resource trading among operators.
Furthermore, the proposed policy for the decentralized
approach improves the overall throughput performance
taking into account interoperator fairness performance.
The spectrum trading approach requires negotiation
costs for spectrum brokerage to achieve efficient, flexible,
and sustainable spectrum sharing, whereas nonnegligible
amounts of spectrum are lost as the costs for the decentral-
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ized spectrum sharing approach. Thus, a hybrid approach
of centralized and decentralized approach was considered
to trade-off central negotiation costs and spectrum loss.
Employing this control results in a reasonable overall
throughput performance with lower negotiation costs com-
pared to those for the centralized approach.
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